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substance or on summit, speech may have significance beyond this tactical

While certain recent developments (cancellation Scandinavian trip. messages to MacMillan and de Gaulle) lead us believe that new Soviet threat phase may be in offing, noteworthy that Dnepropetrovsk speech contains few

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Although timing publication Khrushchev's Dnepropetrovsk speech (after

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announcement Secretary would leave Geneva next Wednesday) probably designed; make it harder for west break off FM conference with no agreement either on

purpose as evidence Khrushchev's thinking and possibly even development this

threats. This may be reflection of tactical purpose mentioned above as well (O as of Vice President's continued presence in USSR. It could, however, also be sign of new seriousness with which Khrushchev may take situation he has

chev in Dnepropetrovsk speech deals at some length with both 1) horrors of war and devastation which it would cause to USSR and 2) thought that US 🕥

Back once more on theme of war, to which he returns frequently, Khrush-

INR Mr. Cumming (in substance))

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should repeat should be deterred by newly enhanced Soviet military power. He, moreover, stunds "unity" theme which more than once in past has meant that USSR, or at least speaker, was facing dangerous situation. While describing horrors of war, he reassures Soviet people by saying that "barometer does not point to war at present." Asks: "Can we really be afraid of anything? We have nothing to fear." In Justifies his own performance by raising Berlin issue in first place by saying that when problems Solved "peoples will thank us for raising them in good time ..." Insisting that Soviet government will not underwrite an agreement perpetuating present Western rights in West Berlin, and, with possibly less conviction, also insisting on all-German committee, Khrushchev exhorts western leaders to be reasonable and give him what he wants. Attempting show necessity for summit he implies that while others word not good, President's is.

In passages about growing strength and spread of communism, folly of US trying stop this process by force of arms and danger inherent in US overseas bases (which he seems to put in more or less same category), Khrushchev appears to be defending his over-all activist foreign policy. In unusual reference to "opinion of Central Committee and Soviet Government" that in view USSR's new strength "imperialists will hardly dare start war," he seems to be trying to share implicit contention responsibility for his manufactor that revolutionary foreign policy is not impressed.

We believe that there are number more steps Soviets can take, without apparent danger of losing control over sequence of events, to apply pressure on west. We think, moreover, that Khrushchev probably remains convinced West's case on Berlin fundamentally weak owing to exposed geographical position. At

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same time Dnepropetrovsk speech leads us wonder whether Khrushchev, although he still hopes to gain through Berlin issue, may not be becoming worried that in last analysis he may be faced with having to choose between 1) backing down on issue on which he has repeatedly committed his prestige and 2) facing small but tangible risk of general war in which he knows with present correlation of forces USSR would sustain frightful damage.

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